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In this paper we assess to what extent in the existence of a financial crisis, government 
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such impact differs in crisis and non crisis times. We use panel analysis for a set of 
OECD and non-OECD countries for the period 1981-2007. The fiscal multiplier for the 
full sample for instrumented regular and crisis spending is about 0.6-0.8 considering the 
sample average government spending share of GDP of about one third. Altogether, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that crisis spending and regular spending have the same 
impact using a variation of controls, sub-samples and specifications.  
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Non-technical summary 
In 2008-2009 the world was hit by one of the deepest financial crises in modern 
history. This relates to both the aggregate volume of non-performing loans (mainly in 
the housing sector) and the fact that international financial linkages almost immediately 
lead to contagion effects around the globe. In the response to these developments, 
governments around the world initiated huge fiscal stimulus packages.  
Today, many economists argue that the economy reacts differently to fiscal policy 
in a financial crisis than during normal times. There are some theoretical contributions 
which distinguish between classical and Keynesian regimes on output and labour 
markets. A more Keynesian regime is one where unemployment and excessive 
capacities coexist. There are disequilibria both on labour and on output markets. One 
may argue that in such a situation fiscal policy may become more effective, replacing 
the lack of private demand for goods and so stimulating private demand for labour. 
Such a policy should have strong crowding-out effects when capacities are already 
exhausted, but this need not be the case when there are excessive capacities. 
We empirically assess to what extent in the existence of financial crisis, 
government spending can contribute to higher economic growth. We employ a panel 
analysis for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries for the period 1981-2007.  
Since causality may run in both directions, from government spending to GDP and 
from GDP to government spending, we address the endogeneity problem by using 
instruments for government spending. More specifically, we introduce a variable that is 
based on the distance to the next or, respectively, to the last democratic election as an 
instrument in our analysis. Moreover, we use past government budget balance-to- GDP 
ratios as another instrument.  
Altogether, and according to our empirical analysis, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that government spending either in the presence or in the absence of a 
financial crisis has the same impact in our sample, using a variation of controls, sub-
samples and specifications. Moreover, we estimate each specification, for the various 
sub-samples with a 1-year and a 2-year definition of financial crisis. The fiscal 
multiplier for the full sample for instrumented regular and crisis spending is about 0.6-
0.8 considering the sample average government spending share of GDP of about one 
third.   5
“The claim that budget deficits make the economy poorer in the long run is 
based on the belief that government borrowing “crowds out” private 
investment.  (…) Under normal circumstances, there is a lot to this 
argument. But circumstances right now are anything but normal.” Paul 
Krugman, NY-Times, December 1, 2008.   
 
“Fiscal policy is back. (…) Fiscal policy must be more effective at times 
when credit and liquidity constraints are tighter, because firms and 
households spending decisions are more dependent on current income.” 




In 2008-2009 the world was hit by what many people now believe is one of the 
deepest financial crises in modern history. This view relates both to the aggregate 
volume of non-performing loans (mainly in the housing sector) and to the fact that 
international financial linkages almost immediately lead to contagion effects around the 
globe. In the response to these developments, governments around the world initiated 
huge fiscal stimulus packages. According to the IMF (2009), the US announced the 
implementation of discretionary fiscal measures of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2009-2010, 
and the European Union unveiled a European Economic Recovery Plan encompassing a 
planned two hundred billion Euro fiscal stimulus package. For the OECD, the 
accumulated budget impact of the stimulus package over 2008-2010 reaches 2.5 percent 
of GDP (OECD, 2009).
1  
Many economists support these measures, including well known scholars such as 
Paul Krugman or Joseph Stiglitz. But also economists who were previously opposed to 
active stabilization policies seem to be in support of such policies under the current – 
exceptional – circumstances.
2  
                                                           
1 In addition, the headline support for the financial sector is estimated (IMF, 2009), for instance, at 3.7% 
of GDP in Germany, 6.3% in the US, and 19.8% in the UK. 
2 In 2008, the German council of economic advisors recently proposed to raise government spending by 1 
percent of GDP in order to stimulate the economy, a measure that hardly would have found its support in 
recent years.   6
These new policy measures contrast with the results of recent empirical research 
on the potential impact of debt-financed fiscal policy measures (such as spending 
programmes and tax reductions) on economic growth. There is a wide body of literature 
which carefully studies the size of fiscal multipliers. The common conclusion of this 
literature is that there are significant effects of fiscal policy on output.
3 Nevertheless, 
many papers also conclude that the size of these effects is rather small and the estimated 
multipliers of government spending or tax reduction are below one. Moreover, in many 
countries the multipliers declined over the 1980s and 1990s. Taking into account that 
any debt-financed fiscal stimulus package has to be repaid later on (with interest 
payments) one may have serious doubts in the usefulness of such policy measures. 
However, one may argue that times of financial crises are different from normal 
times. Indeed, there are some good reasons to believe that the economy reacts 
differently to discretionary fiscal policy in a financial crisis than during normal times. 
First, there are some theoretical contributions which distinguish between more classical 
and more Keynesian regimes on output and labour markets (e.g. Malinvaud 1985, 
Bénassy, 1986). A classical situation would be one, where unemployment is generated 
by excessive real wages while output markets are in equilibrium. A more Keynesian 
regime is one where unemployment and excess capacities coexist. There are 
disequilibria both on labour and on output markets. One can argue that in such a 
situation a fiscal stimulus may become more effective, replacing declining private 
demand for goods and so stimulating private demand for labour. One could view the 
public provision of private goods as a replacement for the private provision of these 
goods. In this case the state would take consumers’ decisions in their place and run a 
                                                           
3 See, for instance, Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), de Arcangelis 
and Lamartina (2003), Galí et al. (2007), Afonso and Claeys (2007), Afonso and Furceri (2010), Afonso 
and González Alegre (2008), and Afonso and Sousa (2009).   7
higher deficit that later on would have to be repaid in form of taxes by these consumers. 
Such a policy might have strong crowding-out effects in a situation where capacities are 
already exhausted, but this need not be the case when there are excess capacities in the 
economy. 
A second argument in favour of discretionary fiscal policy is that a liquidity trap is 
associated with financial crises and that “the only policy that still works is fiscal policy” 
(both Krugman and Stiglitz advocate that). 
Most importantly, one can argue that financial crisis cut off many consumers and 
producers from bank lending. During the current crises, the growth rate of lending to the 
private sector has fallen significantly. This may have two effects on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy measures. First, government transfers or tax reductions may result directly 
in increased consumption of relatively poor, credit constrained consumers. Along these 
lines, Galí et al. (2007) recently calculated larger fiscal policy multipliers when more 
consumers spend their current income. Second, government purchases directly affect the 
survival of some firms.  
Therefore, it is an interesting question whether the emergence of a systemic 
financial crisis changes the way in which fiscal policy measures affect the economy. 
This is the question that we want to address in this empirical research. We assess to 
what extent in the existence of financial crises, government spending can contribute to 
reduce observed output losses and to foster economic growth. We employ a panel 
analysis for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries for the period 1981-2007.  
Since causality may run in both directions, from government spending to GDP and 
from GDP to government spending, we instrument government spending by using a 
variable that is based on the distance to the next or, respectively, to the last democratic   8
election as an instrument in our analysis. Moreover, we also use the past government 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio as an additional instrument. We perform each specification 
and sub-sample with a 1-year and with a 2-year definition of financial crisis, with and 
without time fixed effects. 
Overall, our main result is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that crisis spending 
and spending in the absence of a financial crisis have the same impact throughout our 
study using a variation of controls, sub-samples and specifications.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the 
related literature. Section three briefly presents our empirical methodology. Section four 
reports and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section five concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
A theoretical model that establishes a relationship between credit constraints and 
the effects of fiscal policy is Galí et al. (2007). They develop a sticky price model, in 
which a certain fraction of households always consume their current income. These 
“rule-of-thumb consumers” coexist with Ricardian consumers. The larger the share of 
rule-of-thumb (non-Ricardian) consumers the larger is the effect of fiscal policy on 
output and consumption. One may think of these consumers as credit constrained 
individuals – or as individuals with no access to financial markets at all.
4 Therefore, one 
can view that study as supporting a link between credit market conditions and fiscal 
                                                           
4 The separation between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, which have a higher propensity to 
consume, is quite paramount in the policy discussion, being notably one of the arguments used in support 
of recent fiscal stimuli packages implemented by the authorities in Europe. For the euro area the share of 
non-Ricardian households has been estimated around 25-35% by Ratto, Roeger and in’t Veld (2008) and 
Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2009).   9
policy effectiveness. In addition, a calibration of such a model produces relatively large 
deficit spending multipliers. 
The idea that credit frictions have an impact on the way in which policy shocks 
affect the economy is also well known in monetary economics. An important earlier 
contribution that links credit market imperfections with the impact of policy shocks is 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000). They consider moral hazard in the lending 
relationships between financial intermediaries and firms and between households and 
intermediaries. These imperfections strengthen the impact of macroeconomic shocks on 
output but also the impact of policy responses. Therefore, the study supports the view 
that policy interventions work better when credit markets are not working well.  
The present paper is related to the empirical literature that studies the effects of 
fiscal policy on output growth in “normal times”. For instance, Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) initially applied structured VAR techniques to the measurement of fiscal policy 
effects on output and private consumption in the U.S., and Perotti (2004) extended their 
analysis to other OECD countries. Blanchard and Perotti find a fiscal stimulus in the US 
with multipliers ranging from 0.66 to 0.9. However, they also found that the effects of 
fiscal policies declined in the 1980s. Some multipliers have become insignificant, others 
even negative. Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo (2006) argue that domestic fiscal policy 
multipliers have been declining in the U.S. (since the 1970s) and in Germany (since the 
1980s), and that “cross-border” multipliers (from Germany to seven EU economies) 
have been diminishing.
5 
There is also an ongoing debate in the empirical literature about the role of 
exogenous expansion in government spending on consumption and real wages. Ramey 
                                                           
5 Van Brusselen (2010) provides a broad overview of the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and an evalutaion 
of fiscal multipliers in VAR, macroeconometric models and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models.   10
and Shapiro (1998) find that, following an expansionary fiscal policy shock, output rises 
while private consumption falls (crowding out). Blanchard and Perotti (2002) instead 
find that output and consumption both increase. The main methodological difference is 
that Ramey and Shapiro use war build-ups as exogenous dates to identify fiscal 
expansions while Blanchard and Perotti use identifying restrictions which they derive 
from delays in the response of fiscal policy decisions to the economic development.  
Case studies such as Johnson et al. (2006) also provide valuable insights into the 
effect of particular spending programmes on individual consumption.  
For the EU, and using panel data for the 15 “old” EU countries for the period 
1971-2006, Afonso and González Alegre (2008) identify a negative impact of public 
consumption and social security contributions on economic growth, and a positive 
impact of public investment. They also uncover the existence of a crowding-in effect of 
public investment into private investment that provokes an overall positive effect of 
public investment on economic growth.  
More recently, using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression approach for 
the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Italy, Afonso and Sousa (2009) show that government 
spending shocks, in general, have a small but positive effect on GDP, have a varied 
effect on private consumption and private investment, reflecting the existence of 
important “crowding-out” effects, and in general, impact positively on the price level 
and on the average cost of refinancing the debt.  
For the case of the U.S., Cogan et al. (2009), find that the government spending 
multipliers from permanent increases in federal government purchases are lower in new 
Keynesian models than in old Keynesian models. The differences are quite large 
regarding estimates of the impact on the future development of U.S. government   11
spending in a fiscal package such as the one of February 2009. On the other hand 
Spilimbergo et al. (2008) argue that the content of the fiscal packages put in place in 
2008-2009 by the major developed economies, with targeted tax cuts and transfers are 
likely to have the highest multipliers.  
Related to the 2008 financial crisis Blanchard (2008) argued that fiscal expansion 
must “now play a central role in sustaining domestic demand.” A similar argument was 
previously put forward by Krugman (2005) who argued that fiscal expansion is quite 
possible when economic downturns last for several years and low interest rates reduce 
monetary policy effectiveness. Nevertheless, Cerra and Saxena (2008) report that a 
financial crisis tends to depress long-run growth, which may cast some doubts on the  
short-term effectiveness of fiscal policies under such circumstances. 
For a panel of 19 OECD countries, Tagkalakis (2008) finds that in the presence of 
liquidity constrained households, fiscal policy is more effective in increasing private 
consumption in recessions than in expansions. Such effect squares with the fact that 
usually constrained consumers contemplate short-term horizons in their consumption 
and saving decisions. This issue of credit constrained households is also related to the 
possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations, and the eventuality of ensuing non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policies.
6 
Finally, Baldacci et al. (2009) analyse the impact of fiscal policy taken during 
systemic banking crises, and they show that, if countries are not funding constrained, 
fiscal measures contribute to shortening the length of crisis episodes by stimulating 
aggregate demand. In a related study, Röger, Székely, and Turrini (2010) found that 
fiscal policy seems to play a role in the impact of banking crises on headline growth, an 
                                                           
6 The possibility of expansionary fiscal contsolidations, notably when triggered by a crisis, was initially 
discussed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), although the empirical evidence is diverse (see, for instance, 
Afonso, 2010).   12
insight further rationalised with simulation results. However, these analysis have not 
distinguished between crisis and non-crisis multipliers, which is something that we 
specifically do in our study, by considering normal times and situations of general 
financial turmoil. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
The focus of the present paper is on the role of fiscal policies in phases of 
financial turmoil. Such phases are associated with tighter credit constraints both for 
firms and for households, leading to pronounced economic downturns.  
However, frequent financial crises in single countries are very rare. Hence, if one 
only looks at GDP in individual countries, there may not be enough data points to run a 
time series analysis for several countries, and provide meaningful information about the 
role of fiscal policies during a crisis. In order to overcome this problem we construct an 
unbalanced panel containing data from the available set of OECD and non-OECD 
countries.  
We test the impact of government spending on economic growth during crises and 
normal times by interacting the fiscal stimulus variable with a (dummy) variable that 
indicates the state of the economy, “crisis” or “normal”. In addition, we also perform 
Wald tests with the null-hypothesis that the coefficients of crisis government spending 
and government spending in the absence of crisis are equal. The following linear panel 
model for output growth is then specified, 
 
  1 *' * ( 1 ) it i it it it it it it it it YY X F C S p F C S p F C u β δφ γ θ θ − =+ + + + + − +. (1) 
   13
In (1) the index i (i=1,…, N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…, T) indicates 
the period and βi stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. Yit 
is real output growth for country i in period t, Yit-1 is the observation on the same series 
for the same country i in the previous period, Xit is a vector of additional explanatory 
variables, in period t for country i. FCit (FCit-1) is a dummy variable that captures the 
existence of a financial crisis (in the preceding year), either banking, currency or 
sovereign debt crisis, and Spit is real government spending growth for country i in 
period t. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit are independent across 
countries. The interaction term Spit*FCit denotes government spending in the presence 
of a financial crisis and Spit*(1-FCit) picks up government spending during normal 
times. Both interactions terms are also tested using lags.  
    
3.1. Reverse causality 
Obviously, the specification above is not immune to reverse causality. Current 
economic growth may affect the government’s spending behaviour. The influence of 
GDP growth on contemporaneous spending holds true, in particular, for welfare benefits 
and subsidies, notably via the functioning of automatic stabilisers. For instance, higher 
economic growth reduces expenses for unemployment benefits since more people are 
likely to find a job during an economic upswing. Lower growth can lead to higher 
government transfers as well as to discretionary, countercyclical spending such as 
infrastructure programmes. This negative causal effect from growth on fiscal spending 
would imply an underestimation of the fiscal stimulus’ impact. Due to the large number 
of countries, data on government spending net of transfers were not available and we 
need to refer to different methods to address endogeneity.    14
Also, real economic growth can influence government spending in a positive way 
if governments follow pro-cyclically economic developments
7. Under this assumption, 
politicians do not save (discretionarily) in good times and do not (discretionarily) 
provide fiscal stimuli in crisis times. Without accounting for endogeneity, this effect 
would lead to an overestimation of the fiscal multiplier. In our sample, which includes 
OECD and non-OECD countries, we find evidence of the first assumption, that growth 
affects spending in a negative way. 
A possible way to address endogeneity would be to use time lags of the relevant 
explanatory variables. Due to data availability we can only use yearly change in 
spending. As shown by single country time series studies with quarterly data (for 
instance, Perotti et al., 2004) the positive impact of a government spending shock 
vanishes approximately after four to five quarters. That is, with one year lagged 
spending growth as ordinary control variable, instead of current spending growth, we 
could address the endogeneity problem but we cannot measure the fiscal multiplier 
properly. Using lagged government spending as an instrument captures spending habits 




3.2. Instrumenting spending growth 
Altogether, to address the endogeneity problem we use two instruments, the 
distance to elections referring to the political budget cycle (Brender and Drazen 2005) 
and the lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio. Distance to elections is a linear distance 
                                                           
7 Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) mention that boom-bust phases tend to exacerbate already existing pro-
cyclical policy biases, toward higher spending and public debt ratios. 
8 The results (not shown) for using the lagged crisis spending as an instrument in a basic panel set up are 
not statistically significant.   15
measure between the current year and the year of the next election. The election years 
are taken from Pippa Norris’ Democracy Time series Dataset (2009). For non-OECD 
countries, we use the year of legislative elections. For OECD countries, we use 
legislative elections if the country has a parliamentary system and executive elections if 
the country is characterised by a presidential system.
9 The distance-to-elections 
indicator takes on values from 1 to 5.  
By using a distance-to-elections indicator, which runs throughout the political 
budget cycle, we are benefiting from two effects: increase in spending before elections, 
decrease in spending after elections.
10 We obtain a more robust instrument than only 
using pre-election, election, and post-election dummies by imposing a parameterised 
linear relationship.  
The parameterised linear relation between distance to elections and spending is 
not always identical: empirically, the year of elections (“zero distance”) does not 
display the largest spending increase. Changes in government spending in the year of 
elections depend very much on when elections take place. Elections in spring can 
trigger spending cuts for the rest of the year while elections in autumn can lead to 
spending increases. Since our data do not provide information on the month of 
elections, we test the impact of distance to elections by means of distance year 
dummies, hence without imposing a parametric structure. The coefficient of the election 
year dummy is smaller than the coefficients of the one and two year pre-election 
dummies and more similar to the coefficient of the three year pre-election dummy . 
                                                           
9  Due to data accuracy we use information on the political system only for OECD countries.  
10 The relations between electoral cycles and government behaviour be traced back to Nordhaus (1975) 
and Hibbs (1977), respectively regarding opportunistic and partisan cycles.   16
Thus, we assume that, on average, the spending behaviour three years before elections
11 
is similar to the spending behaviour in the election year. Therefore, we replace the 
actual value of the distance indicator in the election year (zero) by three.
12 Finally, by 
the nature of the instrument, we only capture states with regular elections as reported in 
the dataset. For each specification we report the results of the Kleibergen-Paap test 
reflecting the validity of our instruments.  
As a second instrument we use the one year lagged budget balance-to–GDP ratio, 
the difference between total revenue and total expenditure of the central government 
relative to GDP. To avoid that the instrument lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio is 
capturing good governance and disciplined political institutions, which is in turn 
correlated with GDP growth, the budget balance-to-GDP ratio is lagged twice and 
included in the main regression. Furthermore, to ensure that lagged budget balance to 
GDP is exogenous, we control for lagged spending growth and lagged revenue growth. 
The Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions (not reported) strongly supports 
the validity of the above described instruments.   
  These two instruments capture different aspects of government spending. 
Distance to elections is a good measure for discretionary fiscal activities if politicians 
act according to the “political budget cycle’’. The budget balance ratio considers the 
financial leeway provided by last year’s government budget to predict current spending. 
We perform the instrumental variable estimations with one and two (interacted) 
instruments.  
 
                                                           
11 In our sample, the average election cycle is four years. Therefore, three years before the next election 
corresponds on average to the post election year.  
12 Imposing a missing value in the election year or using the value of two instead of three we obtain 
similar but less robust results. The actual distance indicator for a country with a 4-year cycle over a period 
of, for instance, 8 years starting with an election year is accordingly: 3-3-2-1-3-3-2-1.   17
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
Our panel covers 127 countries out of which 98 countries experienced financial 
crises during the years 1981-2007. The crisis dummy was taken from the IMF dataset 
on financial crisis. The maximum number of observations used, due to data availability 
across the panel, is 2867 (3271 observations were initially gathered), and the number of 
crises years is 218 (encompassing banking, currency and sovereign debt crises). To 
avoid the influence of outliers, we restrict the dependent variable, GDP growth, as well 
as the spending variables by excluding the first and last percentile of the sample. Data 
descriptions and sources are reported in the Appendix. 
In our panel, government spending increases on average at 0.76 percent of GDP 
per year. Spending decreases on a yearly basis by 0.05 percent of last period’s GDP on 
average in the starting year of the crisis and by 0.1 percent of GDP in the next year. 
Hence, during financial crises governments tend to spend less money, eventually 
because revenues decline as well. Only during 90 crisis episodes we observe a positive 
change in government spending relative to GDP the year after the beginning of the 
crisis. 
Real GDP growth is adversely affected by a financial crisis as will be confirmed in 
our regression results reported in the next sections. While the average real growth rate 
in our panel is 3.4%, it goes down to 0.1% during a crisis.  
We also collected data on claims to the private sector. Indeed, some existing 
evidence links credit contractions to financial markets distress (see, Claessens et al., 
2008), and the hypothesis that increases in credit concession to the private sector can 
attenuate economic slowdowns is then tested.    18
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
Table 1 reports the panel estimation results using real GDP growth as the 
dependent variable as in specification (1), using only the distance to elections as an 
instrument for real government spending growth, and controlling for the existence of a 
financial crisis, in which case the dummy variable FC assumes the value of one (zero 
otherwise). We perform each specification with a 1-year definition of financial crisis – 
FC equals one in the starting year of the crisis – and a 2-year definition of financial 
crisis (reported in the Annex) – where FC2 equals one in the crisis’ starting year as well 
as in the following year.  
From Table 1 we can see that increases in real government spending growth have 
a positive impact on real GDP growth. In addition, the estimated government spending 
coefficients are higher when a crisis occurs. However, as shown by the Wald test, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients for government 
spending are equal with and without a financial crisis. The existence of a financial crisis 
also decreases real growth unequivocally. In this specification government spending 
coefficients can not directly be interpreted as fiscal multipliers. We have to multiply 
them by the inverse average share of government spending in GDP.
13 In our data 
sample, government spending amounts to around 36% of GDP for the full sample, 33% 
of GDP for non-OECD countries and 46% of GDP for OECD countries. Overall, the 
above fiscal multipliers (about 0.6-08 for regular and crisis spending) are somewhat 
smaller when compared to multipliers observed in the existing literature. 
 
                                                           
13 With Y – GDP, G – government spending, m – fiscal multiplier, (Yt-Yt-1)/Yt-1=m(Gt-Gt-1)/Gt-1⇔ 
∆Yt=m∆Gt(Yt-1/Gt-1) and  /( / ) . YG m Y G ∆∆ ≅ ×    19
Table 1 – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, instrument: 
distance to elections, 1-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC)  0.322*  0.228* 0.180 0.0858 
  (1.89) (1.70) (1.24) (0.68) 
Spending*FC  0.642 0.489*  0.428* 0.601 
  (1.10) (1.93) (1.80) (1.60) 
GDP(-1) 0.197  0.243***  0.242**  0.142* 
  (1.58) (2.66) (2.49) (1.73) 
FC -0.0797**  -0.0869***  -0.0909***  (dropped) 
 (-2.17)  (-3.89)  (-4.36)   
FC(-1) 0.000166  -0.000828  -0.00112  -0.00618 
 (0.03)  (-0.15)  (-0.22)  (-1.20) 
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1))   0.00586  0.00472  0.00541 
   (0.33)  (0.26)  (0.33) 
Spending(-1)*FC(-1)   0.0645  0.0583  0.0700 
   (1.49)  (1.41)  (1.05) 
Revenue(-1)   0.00815  0.0139  0.0246 
   (0.33)  (0.54)  (1.33) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0168*** 
       (2.65) 
Inflation       -0.00261** 
       (-2.20) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2605 2516 2516 1937 
Cross-sections  122 122 122 101 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  6.91 8.10 6.41 5.35 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0086 0.0044 0.0113 0.0207 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.28 0.87 0.80 1.57 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.5959 0.3502 0.3719 0.2096 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC – dummy variable for the existence of 
financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. Constant 
as well as fixed effects interactions with crises dummy are partialled out. 
 
Similar results can be observed when government spending is instrumented with 
both the distance to elections and the lagged budget balance (see Table 2). In this case, 
the fiscal multiplier is around 0.8.  In addition, both with one and with two instruments, 
we can see that claims to the private sector have a positive estimated coefficient, 
implying that increases in credit concession to the private sector can positively impinge 
on economic growth (see last columns of tables 1 and 2).   20
Our sample comprises observations from a diverse set of countries and thus 
collects information from very heterogeneous financial crises. To allow for a different 
severity of crisis across countries and a reaction of economic variables to the occurrence 
of financial crisis (possibly due, for instance, to institutional differences) we interact 
country dummies with crisis dummies in each specification.  
 
Table 2 – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, instrument: 
distance to elections and lagged budget balance, 1-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC) 0.151***  0.291**  0.251**  0.192 
  (2.95) (2.48) (2.20) (1.36) 
Spending*FC 0.128  0.263**  0.256**  0.140 
  (1.60) (2.13) (2.12) (1.09) 
GDP(-1) 0.307***  0.226***  0.216***  0.117 
  (5.68) (2.92) (2.81) (1.40) 
GDP(-2) 0.0190  0.0227  0.0237  0.00771 
  (0.53) (0.64) (0.69) (0.22) 
FC -0.111***  -0.104***  -0.105***   
 (-5.79)  (-5.40)  (-5.53)   
FC(-1) -0.00835**  -0.00418  -0.00427  -0.00747 
  (-2.06) (-0.85) (-0.92) (-1.42) 
Budget  balance  ratio(-2)  -0.0315 -0.113 -0.0991 -0.134 
  (-1.24) (-1.48) (-1.40) (-1.40) 
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1))   0.0367  0.0310  0.0375 
   (1.28)  (1.15)  (1.11) 
Spending(-1)*FC(-1)   0.0533  0.0487  0.00794 
   (1.01)  (0.96)  (0.11) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.0163  -0.00886  -0.00289 
   (-0.66)  (-0.38)  (-0.12) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0165*** 
       (3.10) 
Inflation       -0.00193*** 
       (-4.13) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2504 2439 2439 1884 
No.  Clusters  122 122 122 101 
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic  26.14  13.80  14.31  9.22 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0000 0.0032 0.0025 0.0264 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.07 0.09 0.00 0.14 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.7931 0.7691 0.9596 0.7090 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC – dummy variable for the existence of 
financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. Equation 
(4) is over-identified. Constant as well as fixed effects interactions with crises dummy are partialled out.   21
 
The above results from the IV regression with “differentiated fixed effects” are 
similar to the results obtained with a sample split into crises and non-crises 
observations.
14 By keeping the full sample and introducing a country specific 
interaction term with crises we benefit from gains in efficiency and instrument validity. 
Moreover, we can directly test the hypothesis of equality between spending in crises 
and non-crises times.
15   
A direct consequence of this approach is that – as in the case of fixed effects – 
observations for countries with only one crisis-year (singleton dummies) are not 
included in the analysis. Since many countries indeed experienced several financial 
crises, our FC dummy variable captures 111 crises years for 45 countries with 2 to 4 
crises. The coefficient of the FC dummy in the tables has to be interpreted by taking 
into account that country specific crises reactions of GDP have already been partialled 
out. For robustness, we run every specification with a 2-year definition of crises, which 
also includes observations with only one crisis per country (see Annex).  
 
Instrument Performance 
In Tables 1 and 2 we can reject the null hypothesis that the equation is 
underidentified. In Table 2, including the lagged budget ratio balance improves the 
instrument performance in the first stage for crisis spending. Indeed, the Kleibergen-
Paap test statistic also passes the critical value of 10 allowing rejecting the null of 
underidentification.  
                                                           
14 Tables are not reported and can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
15 The coefficients of these interaction terms are not reported since they are partialled out in the 
regressions, together with the constant.    22
Therefore, regular distance to elections and regular lagged budget balance ratios 
are good predictors for regular spending. The closer to elections, the higher is spending 
growth. The larger the buffer provided by last year’s budget balance position relative to 
last year’s GDP, the higher is government spending growth during normal times. The 
instrument lagged budget balance has a similar performance during financial crises as 
during regular times: there is a significant and positive correlation between regular 
spending and regular lagged budget balance. Distance to elections, however, changes 
the sign such that the political budget cycle during crises is positively correlated with 
crisis spending and is weakly (1-year crisis) to highly (2-year crisis, see Annex) 





According to the results in Table 1 and 2 the fiscal multiplier for instrumented 
regular spending ranges between 0.6 and 1.1 assuming an average government spending 
share of GDP of about one third.
17 In addition, reverse causality seems to be stronger in 
crisis times. Indeed, our results show a somewhat larger marginal impact for crisis 
spending. Intuitively, this is appealing, implying that social transfers and discretionary 
spending react stronger during an expected and/or experienced economic downturn than 
in times of an economic upswing. Overall, albeit the qualitative differences, 
endogeneity does not influence our findings since the marginal impact of spending is 
not statistically different in crisis and non-crisis times. 
                                                           
16 Exogeneity tests rejected the hypothesis that a fall in GDP leads to new elections, hence we reject the 
hypothesis that the instrument is correlated with the dependent variable. 
17 Our estimates based on different instruments yield output multipliers that are close to the ones derived, 
for instance, in the papers by Baxter and King (1993), Linnemann and Schabert (2003).   23
Moreover, government spending in the presence of a financial crisis, when 
compared to normal times, is clearly larger in Table 1 compared to Table 2. This is 
likely to be due to a weak instrument bias for crisis spending when using only the 
distance to elections indicator (see above). Including the lagged budget balance ratio, 
the coefficients of crisis spending and regular spending are approximately equal.  
 
4.3. Robustness analysis 
OECD and non-OECD economies    
Evidence from the related literature points out that (economic) cyclical fiscal 
behaviour in developed economies is somewhat different from the case of developing 
economies. The conventional wisdom that emerges from such studies is that fiscal 
policy is counter-cyclical or a-cyclical in most developed countries, while it is pro-
cyclical in developing countries.
18 More specifically, reverse causality could be 
different in developed and developing economies. It is therefore important to analyse 
the instrument’s performance and instrumented fiscal multipliers in OECD and non-
OECD sub-samples.  
As Table 3 shows, the results for non-OECD countries are close to the results 
obtained for the full sample and fiscal multipliers, for both crisis and regular spending, 
are on average 0.6. In addition, the instruments behave similarly in the first stage and 
statistical significance is even stronger compared to the full sample regressions.  
For OECD countries, however, distance to elections, i.e. the political budget 
cycle, does not perform very well as an instrument during regular times (see Table 4). 
 
                                                           
18 See, for instance, Galí (1994), Lane (2003), Kaminsky et al. (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), and 
Alesina et al. (2008)   24
Table 3 – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, instrument: 
distance to elections and lagged budget balance, non-OECD countries, 1-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC) 0.153***  0.258**  0.218**  0.177 
  (3.08) (2.48) (2.18) (1.53) 
Spending*FC  0.137* 0.258** 0.237*  0.170 
  (1.65) (1.97) (1.90) (1.33) 
GDP(-1)  0.295*** 0.229*** 0.218***  0.0951 
  (5.08) (2.99) (2.96) (1.26) 
GDP(-2)  0.0329 0.0376 0.0295 0.0147 
  (0.83) (0.98) (0.80) (0.40) 
FC  -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.105*** (dropped) 
  (-5.72) (-5.33) (-5.47)   
FC(-1) -0.00756*  -0.00301  -0.00337  -0.00579 
  (-1.66) (-0.56) (-0.68) (-0.98) 
Budget  balance  ratio(-2)  -0.0324 -0.102 -0.0825 -0.160 
  (-0.96) (-1.20) (-1.08) (-1.39) 
Spending*(1-FC(-1))   0.0332  0.0253  0.0422 
   (1.14)  (0.93)  (1.17) 
Spending*FC(-1)   0.0545  0.0476  0.0268 
   (1.03)  (0.93)  (0.39) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.0121  -0.00362  -0.00673 
   (-0.50)  (-0.16)  (-0.26) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0168** 
      ( 2 . 3 2 )  
Inflation      -0.00204*** 
      (-4.33) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1814 1750 1750 1261 
Cross-sections  94 94 94 73 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  26.99 15.79 16.36 12.42 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0000 0.0013 0.0010 0.0061 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.8479 0.9969 0.8329 0.9568 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC – dummy variable for the existence of 
financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. Constant 
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Table 4 – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, instrument: 
distance to elections and lagged budget balance, OECD countries, 1-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC)  0.784 1.029 0.719  -0.0415 
  (1.00) (0.85) (1.09) (-0.15) 
Spending*FC 0.303***  0.327**  0.284*  0.216* 
  (2.65) (1.99) (1.79) (1.73) 
GDP(-1) 0.121  -0.00886  0.0932  0.411*** 
 (0.32)  (-0.02)  (0.26)  (4.03) 
GDP(-2) -0.135  -0.141*  -0.0971  -0.0642 
  (-1.55) (-1.65) (-1.44) (-1.29) 
FC (dropped)  0.0488***  (dropped)  (dropped) 
   (3.87)     
FC(-1) -0.0314  -0.0379  -0.0336  -0.00437 
  (-1.08) (-0.83) (-1.05) (-0.28) 
Budget balance ratio(-2)  -0.135  -0.237  -0.167  -0.00491 
  (-0.99) (-0.90) (-1.20) (-0.06) 
Spending*(1-FC(-1))   -0.0234  0.0138  0.0364* 
   (-0.46)  (0.32)  (1.78) 
Spending*FC(-1)   -0.0410  0.161  -0.0359 
   (-0.10)  (0.43)  (-0.20) 
Revenue(-1)   0.0213  -0.00359  0.00969 
   (0.26)  (-0.06)  (0.35) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.00730 
       (1.39) 
Inflation       -0.0198* 
       (-1.81) 
Time Fixed Effects   No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  690 689 689 623 
Cross-sections  28 28 28 28 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  2.69 0.68 1.11 3.68 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.4423 0.8775 0.7740 0.2977 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.32 0.37 0.48 1.12 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.5702 0.5448 0.4907 0.2907 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC – dummy variable for the existence of 
financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. Constant 
as well as fixed effects interactions with crises dummy are partialled out. 
 
Literature on the political budget cycle mostly confirms our results of different 
fiscal attitudes in OECD and non-OECD countries (see, for instance, Shi and Svensson, 
2006). Interestingly, distance to elections matters for crisis spending as we find a 
significant negative correlation in the first stage. In other words, during financial crisis, 
fiscal action is required by the electorate in OECD countries. The lagged budget   26
balance-to-GDP ratio is also significant during crisis with a clearly larger coefficient 
than in the non-OECD countries regressions, while it is not significant in regular times.  
Overall, it proved to be difficult to build a significant instrument for regular 
spending in OECD countries. Therefore, in Table 4 (and 4b in the Annex) the under 
identification test is not passed. The reported value, however, only captures the average 
validity of instruments over both endogenous variables. The instruments for crisis 
spending, crisis distance to elections and crisis lagged budget balance, are still highly 
significant in the first stage. The fiscal multiplier of crisis spending ranges between 0.5 
and 0.7 and is therefore slightly larger than in non-OECD countries (the underlying 
fiscal share is 46% of GDP, as described above).  
 
Banking crisis 
The previous analysis showed the impact of government spending on economic 
growth during up to 141 financial crises, which included banking crises, currency crises, 
and debt crises. Table 5 reports on to which extent government spending and growth are 
correlated during 60 banking crises.  
Given the limited number of banking crises recorded in the IMF dataset on 
financial crisis, between 1981 and 2007 and, in particular, the high proportion of only 
one banking crises per country, we can only use the 2-year definition of crises, which 
provides us with two observations per crisis and thus allows us to use the singleton 
crises. Again, country dummies are interacted with banking crisis dummy in 
specifications (1)-(3) in Table 5, hence the coefficient of BC2 has to be interpreted 
taking into account the country specific crises reactions. Without interactions, BC2 is 
significantly negative, as in regression (1).    27
Table 5 – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, instrument: 
distance to elections and lagged budget balance, 2-year banking crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IV IV IV 
Spending*(1-BC2) 0.163***  0.195*  0.172 
  (2.93) (1.83) (1.62) 
Spending*BC2  -0.164 -0.116 -0.130 
  (-1.25) (-1.07) (-1.15) 
GDP(-1)  0.278*** 0.249*** 0.232*** 
  (4.42) (3.19) (2.97) 
GDP(-2)  0.0323 0.0417 0.0395 
  (0.97) (1.32) (1.25) 
BC2  0.0571*** 0.0550*** 0.0531*** 
  (7.68) (8.26) (7.99) 
Budget Balance to GDP(-2)  -0.0314  -0.0621  -0.0612 
  (-1.24) (-0.89) (-0.90) 
Spending(-1)   0.00876  0.00805 
   (0.33)  (0.31) 
Revenue(-1)   0.00749  0.0101 
   (0.35)  (0.47) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
Observations  2438 2375 2375 
Cross-sections  119 119 119 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  22.92 14.42 13.86 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value 0.0000 0.0024 0.0031 
Wald  Test  Statistic  5.48 6.69 6.27 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.0193 0.0097 0.0123 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. BC2 – dummy variable for the existence 
of banking crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified.  
 
Essentially, in the IV estimation spending significantly differs in crises and non-
crises times. While there is no impact of a change in spending in the first and second 
year of a banking crises on GDP growth, the impact of spending in normal times is still 
positive (and mostly significant) with a multiplier of about 0.5. 
Performing the analysis with all remaining financial crises, hence debt and 
currency crises, supports these results (see Table 5b in the Annex), and the coefficient 
of crisis spending is larger as for the full set of financial crises. The difference between 
spending in crisis times and normal times is not significant.   28
 
5. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have studied the impact of government spending on output 
notably during the occurrence of financial crises, covering 127 countries for the period 
1981-2007. We have performed each estimation using a 1-year and a 2-year definition 
of financial crisis, with and without time fixed effects.  
  To address the endogeneity issue we have used two instruments: the distance to 
elections – a linear distance measure between the current year and the year of the next 
election – and the lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio. According to the results, the 
fiscal multiplier for instrumented regular spending ranges between 0.6 and 0.8, 
considering the average government spending share of GDP of about one third. The 
multipliers of instrumented government spending are higher than the simple OLS 
multipliers. However, the differences between the coefficients of government spending 
in crises and non-crises periods are also insignificant in most of our estimations. 
  More specifically, the fiscal multiplier for the full sample and for the non-OECD 
sub-sample, for instrumented regular and crisis government spending, is about 0.6, with 
an average government spending-to-GDP ratio of one third. For the OECD sub-sample, 
government spending in the presence of a financial crisis also produces a fiscal 
multiplier of 0.6 assuming an average fiscal share of GDP of around 40 percent. 
Moreover, for the sub-sets of OECD and non-OECD countries our results show, that 
altogether, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that government spending either in the 
presence or in the absence of a financial crisis has the same impact. Interestingly, for the 
cases when a banking crisis occurred, our results do not support the idea that 
expansionary fiscal policies positively impact on economic growth.    29
  Therefore, the main result of our panel analysis is that that government spending 
has essentially the same impact on economic growth with or without a financial crisis. 
This result holds throughout our sample, using a variation of controls, sub-samples and 
specifications. Consequently, taking into account that larger spending programmes tend 
to be less targeted, this indicates that they may actually not be particularly helpful.  
  The present analysis is a first step and these conclusions are tentative. Additional 
research is needed to further study the relevance of fiscal policies in the context of 
financial crisis. One way forward would be to use more detailed data on the 
composition of government spending and to distinguish between budgetary components 
that react to changes in output and others that don’t. 
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Appendix – Data description and sources 
Non-performing loans: data available on the website of Luc Laeven, reported as a 
percentage of GDP at the peak of a crisis. http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
Year of crisis: banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis. Source: IMF database on 
financial crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008), and at 
http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
Government spending: general government spending deflated with the GDP deflator. 
For some countries only central government data are available. Source: IMF World 
Economic Outlook database. 
Budget balance: general government budget balance as percent of GDP. For some 
countries only central government data are available. Source: IMF World Economic 
Outlook database. 
Government debt: government gross debt as percent of GDP. For some countries only 
central government data are available. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 
database. 
Real GDP: Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
GDP gap: difference between actual and trend real GDP, as a percentage of trend real 
GDP. Trend GDP is estimated using an HP-filter on real GDP. The lambda value is 
chosen as 100. 
Inflation rate: Consumer price index. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database 
Long-term nominal interest rate: Data are only available for OECD countries. Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook database. 
Election dates: Legal and Executive Elections taken from Pippa Norris. 2009. 
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List of countries 
 
 All  countries   OECD  sub-sample 
Albania Ghana  Oman  Australia 
Algeria Greece Pakistan  Austria 
Antigua and Barbuda  Guinea Panama  Belgium 
Argentina Guinea-Bissau  Paraguay  Canada 
Australia Guyana  Peru  Czech  Republic 
Austria Hungary  Philippines  Denmark 
Azerbaijan Iceland  Poland  Finland 
Bahamas, The  India Portugal  France 
Bangladesh Indonesia  Romania  Germany 
Barbados Iran  Russia  Greece 
Belgium  Ireland  São Tomé and Príncipe  Hungary 
Belize Israel  Saudi  Arabia  Iceland 
Bolivia Italy  Senegal  Ireland 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Jamaica Seychelles  Italy 
Brazil Japan Singapore Japan 
Bulgaria Jordan  Slovak  Republic  Korea 
Burkina Faso  Kazakhstan  Slovenia  Luxembourg 
Burundi Kenya  South  Africa  Mexico 
Cambodia Korea  Spain  Netherlands 
Canada  Kuwait  Sri Lanka  New Zealand 
Cape Verde  Kyrgyz Republic  Swaziland  Norway 
Chile Lao    Sweden  Poland 
China Latvia Switzerland  Portugal 
Colombia  Lebanon  Syrian Arab Republic  Slovak Republic 
Costa Rica  Lithuania  Taiwan   Spain 
Côte d'Ivoire  Luxembourg  Tajikistan  Sweden 
Croatia Madagascar  Thailand  Switzerland 
Cyprus  Malaysia  Trinidad and Tobago  United Kingdom 
Czech Republic  Mauritania  Turkmenistan  United States 
Denmark Mauritius Uganda   
Djibouti Mexico  Ukraine  
Dominican Republic  Moldova  United Arab Emirates   
Ecuador Mongolia  United  Kingdom   
Egypt Morocco  United  States   
El Salvador  Mozambique  Uruguay   
Equatorial Guinea  Namibia  Uzbekistan   
Estonia Nepal  Venezuela   
Ethiopia Netherlands  Vietnam  
Fiji New  Zealand  Yemen   
Finland Nicaragua  Zambia  
France Niger  Zimbabwe   
Georgia Nigeria     
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Annex – Additional results 
 
Table 1b – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, 
instrument: distance to elections, 2-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC2) 0.337**  0.275**  0.212*  0.146 
  (2.32) (2.26) (1.68) (1.40) 
Spending*FC2  0.512 0.399 0.339 0.271 
  (1.17) (1.53) (1.41) (1.42) 
GDP(-1)  0.131  0.160* 0.171** 0.0689 
  (1.29) (1.90) (2.02) (0.91) 
FC2  -0.0841*** -0.0837*** -0.0789***   
 (-12.90)  (-20.14)  (-16.93)   
Spending(-1)   0.0203  0.0178  0.00712 
    (1.00) (0.90) (0.47) 
Revenue(-1)   0.000643  0.00608  0.0166 
    (0.03) (0.31) (1.14) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0150*** 
      ( 2 . 7 6 )  
Inflation      -0.00222*** 
      (-3.09) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2605  2516  2516  1937 
Cross-sections  122 122 122 101 
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic  11.05  12.12  10.68  9.47 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0009 0.0005 0.0011 0.0021 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.14 0.20 0.22 0.35 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.7040 0.6575 0.6400 0.5555 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively: A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. . GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC2 – dummy variable for the existence 
of financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. 
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Table 2b – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, 
instrument: distance to elections and lagged budget balance, 2-year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC2) 0.164***  0.262**  0.224**  0.207* 
  (2.80) (2.38) (2.11) (1.82) 
Spending*FC2 0.0692  0.181*  0.175*  0.105 
  (0.95) (1.75) (1.70) (1.14) 
GDP(-1) 0.257***  0.193***  0.183**  0.0782 
  (4.73) (2.68) (2.55) (1.05) 
GDP(-2)  0.0329 0.0414 0.0450 0.0240 
  (1.03) (1.33) (1.52) (0.78) 
FC2 -0.0814***  -0.0836***  -0.0786***   
 (-54.12)  (-40.78)  (-23.58)   
Budget  balance  ratio(-2)  -0.0232 -0.0898 -0.0795 -0.141* 
  (-0.82) (-1.25) (-1.20) (-1.79) 
Spending(-1)   0.0291  0.0253  0.0259 
   (1.10)  (0.98)  (0.86) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.00708  -0.00240  -0.00141 
   (-0.34)  (-0.12)  (-0.07) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0158*** 
       (3.23) 
Inflation       -0.00203*** 
       (-3.88) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2504 2439 2439 1884 
No.  Clusters  122 122 122 101 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  25.54 15.53 16.71 13.60 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0000 0.0014 0.0008 0.0035 
Wald  Test  Statistic  1.08 0.55 0.21 1.19 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.2995 0.4592 0.6488 0.2753 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. . GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC2 – dummy variable for the existence 
of financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic test the null that the equation is underidentified. Constant 
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Table 3b – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, 
instrument: distance to elections and lagged budget balance, non-OECD countries, 2-
year crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC2) 0.168***  0.248**  0.203**  0.192** 
  (2.99) (2.54) (2.17) (2.05) 
Spending*FC2 0.0985  0.209**  0.183*  0.147 
  (1.47) (2.08) (1.85) (1.49) 
GDP(-1) 0.239***  0.180**  0.174**  0.0478 
  (4.15) (2.48) (2.47) (0.67) 
GDP(-2) 0.0467  0.0588*  0.0513  0.0328 
  (1.33) (1.74) (1.61) (0.98) 
FC2 -0.0821***  -0.0847***  -0.0771***   
  (-54.66) (-36.37) (-18.50)   
Budget  balance  ratio(-2)  -0.0204 -0.0870 -0.0663 -0.174* 
  (-0.55) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-1.77) 
Spending(-1)   0.0306  0.0230  0.0346 
   (1.10)  (0.87)  (1.08) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.00662  0.000649  -0.00635 
   (-0.32)  (0.03)  (-0.32) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0147** 
       (2.29) 
Inflation       -0.00210*** 
       (-4.20) 
Observations  1814 1750 1750 1261 
Cross-sections  94 94 94 73 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  27.30 17.92 19.63 17.05 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.73 0.17 0.04 0.27 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.3927 0.6816 0.8348 0.6028 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively: A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC2 – dummy variable for the existence 
of financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic test the null that the equation is underidentified. Constant 
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Table 4b – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, 
instrument: distance to elections and lagged budget balance, OECD countries, 2-year 
crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-FC2)  1.052** 1.132** 0.694**  0.157 
  (2.00) (2.20) (2.33) (0.66) 
Spending*FC2 -0.322***  -0.284**  -0.143  -0.222 
  (-2.75) (-2.15) (-0.65) (-1.12) 
GDP(-1) -0.0454  -0.0615  0.0969  0.300*** 
 (-0.17)  (-0.24)  (0.63)  (2.80) 
GDP(-2) -0.131  -0.116  -0.0756  -0.0523 
  (-1.42) (-1.16) (-1.24) (-1.02) 
FC2 (dropped)  0.0423**  (dropped)  (dropped) 
   (2.54)     
Budget  balance  ratio(-2)  -0.181* -0.262**  -0.165** -0.0624 
  (-1.86) (-2.23) (-2.19) (-0.89) 
Spending(-1)   -0.0362  0.00939  0.0272 
   (-0.64)  (0.21)  (1.04) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.00227  -0.0232  -0.00435 
   (-0.03)  (-0.49)  (-0.18) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.00974 
      ( 1 . 5 0 )  
Inflation      -0.0129 
      (-1.45) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  690 689 689 623 
Cross-sections  28 28 28 28 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  6.16 5.73 7.27 5.53 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.1039 0.1254 0.0637 0.1366 
Wald  Test  Statistic  6.97 7.70 5.40 3.57 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.0083 0.0055 0.0201 0.0589 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. GDP, Spending, 
Revenue and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. FC2 – dummy variable for the existence 
of financial crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. 
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Table 5b – Results for real GDP growth (1981-2007), spending growth rates, 
instruments: distance to elections and lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio, 2-year debt 
and currency crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending*(1-DCC2) 0.170***  0.302***  0.276**  0.226* 
  (3.00) (2.72) (2.49) (1.87) 
Spending*DCC2 0.107  0.238*  0.226*  0.396* 
  (1.28) (1.88) (1.90) (1.87) 
GDP(-1) 0.229***  0.159**  0.143*  0.0701 
  (4.06) (2.00) (1.80) (0.84) 
GDP(-2)  0.0392 0.0413 0.0387 0.0204 
  (1.27) (1.34) (1.32) (0.60) 
DCC2  -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.136***  0.00701 
  (-46.30) (-32.66) (-23.63)  (0.95) 
Budget balance ratio(-2)  -0.0248  -0.112  -0.107  -0.171* 
  (-0.93) (-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.90) 
Spending(-1)   0.0392  0.0387  0.0400 
   (1.37)  (1.36)  (1.13) 
Revenue(-1)   -0.0168  -0.0145  -0.0112 
   (-0.78)  (-0.67)  (-0.48) 
Claims on Private Sector        0.0143*** 
      ( 2 . 9 3 )  
Inflation      -0.00225*** 
      (-3.67) 
Time Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2438 2375 2375 1863 
Cross-sections  119 119 119  98 
Kleibergen-Paap  LM  Statistic  26.64 14.68 14.77 11.74 
Kleibergen-Paap  p-value  0.0000 0.0021 0.0020 0.0083 
Wald  Test  Statistic  0.48 0.35 0.21 0.87 
Wald  Test  p-value  0.4896 0.5546 0.6470 0.3513 
 
Notes: unbalanced panels with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote level 
of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis 
spending and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. . GDP, Spending, 
Revenue  and Claims on Private Sector are used as growth rates. DCC2 – dummy variable for the 
existence of a debt or currency crisis. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is 
underidentified. Constant as well as fixed effects interactions with crises dummy are partialled out. 
 